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A SYMPOSIUM ON STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
FOREWORD
FELIX FRANKFURTER*

Since even Professor Wade, the Faculty Editor of the Vanderbilt
Law Review, has yielded to the theory of blurbs, who am I to gainsay him
and deny myself the pleasure of expressing a word of warm appreciation
for an admirable symposium on statutory construction? The symposium is
illuminating not because it has spawned new ideas which will relieve lawyers
from the hard, high tasks of advocacy or judges from the anguish of judgment.
The abstract ideas in the papers, apart from their concrete applications, are
not, I venture to believe, very different from what is found in a charming
essay on statutory interpretation written nearly four hundred years ago,
for which we are indebted to Professor Samuel E. Thorne of Yale.' Nor,
indeed, has much been added by way of generalities to the wisdom of the
resolutions in Heydoi,'s Case, as reported in the robust English of Coke's
2
Reports.
The interpretation of statutes is merely one aspect of the interpretation
of writings generally. Since man has been busy writing for a good long
while, the problems of rendering what has been written are as old as composition itself. To be sure, thought has not stood still. It has been nourished
by advances in scholarship in many directions, particularly pertaining to
language and the relation of words to thought and feeling. Thus, by shrewd
insight into the properties of the word "allowance" a very cultivated and
learned judge may not only find his clue to the proper construction of
an Australian tax act; he thereby opens up veins of helpful suggestions
for construing wholly different statutes. "'Allowance' is one of the many
words," Mr. Justice Dixon of the High Court of Australia wrote, "which
take their meaning from a context rather .than affecting or controlling
the meaning of other words of the context in which they occur. For, considered
alone and at rest rather than at work with other words, it means the allowing
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of a thing or a thing allowed. It is only by its application that you discover
the kind of thing in mind." 3
The worth of these papers lies precisely in the fact that they may
be fairly called modern instances of old saws. The central problem of
statutory construction is to ascertain meaning. But the meaning is to
be found by one authority of another's composition. The divorce of the
functions of authorship and interpretation becomes of profound importance
when such divorce is one of the great safeguards of a free society. This
may sound like a highfalutin way of referring to the separation of powers.
Highfalutin or not, consciously kept in mind or not, this is the source of
the judiciary's problems in construing legislation.
It was of course not always thus. The problems were different when
judges were lawmakers and lawmakers were judges, before adjudication
was separated from legislation. With easy confidence the great Hengham
could stop counsel's argument as to the meaning of an Act of Parliament,
when Hengbam contemporaneously sat in Parliament, with "Do not gloss the
Statute; we understand it better than you do, for we made it." This was in
4
1305.
Innocent as the Victorians were supposed to have been, Lord Halsbury
was far less cocksure than Chief Justice Hengham that the author of a
statute is its most dependable interpreter. With characteristic dogmatism
he thought the opposite. As the occupant of the woolsack, the surviving
anachronism in exercising the disparate functions of legislator and judge,
he had this to say:
"I

have more than once had occasion to say that in construing a

statute I

believe the worst person to construe it is the person who is responsible for its
drafting. He is very much disposed to confuse what he intended to do with the effect
of the language which in fact has been employed. At the time he drafted the statute,
at all events, he may have been under the impression that he had given full effect to
what was intended, but he may be mistaken in construing it afterwards just because
what was in his mind was what was intended, though, perhaps, it was not done."'

But perhaps an even more treacherous business than finding the meaning
of one's own composition is to interpret what another meant. Words both
elude and betray meaning. The subtlety of the process involved in extracting
fairly the thought beneath words is given illusory simplicity by talk about
the intention of the legislature. When counsel used that phrase, Mr. justice
Holmes was wont to say with courteous downrightness, "I don't care what
their intention was. I only want to know what the words meant." In one
of those felicitous sentences which Mr. Justice Holmes tossed off in a
3. Mutual Acceptance Co. v. Federal Comm'r of Taxation, 69 C.L.R. 389, 402 (1944).
4. Aumeye v. Anon., Y.B. 33 & 35 Edv. I, 79, 82 (Horwood ed. 1879); see also
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letter, he characterized intention as "a residuary clause intended to gatherup
whatever other aids there may be to interpretation beside the particular words
and the dictionary."
An enactment is an organism in its environment. And the environment
is not merely the immediate political or social context in which it is to be
placed, but the whole traditional system of law and law enforcement, of
recognized remedies and procedures which are the presuppositions of our
law. This is the truth behind the rather grandiloquent statement of Bishop
when he said: "A statute is simply a fresh particle of legal matter dropped
into the previously-existing ocean of law." 6
The task of judicial interpretation derives from the fact that mere reading
does not yield meaning. This is so because of the finitude of even the most
piercing legislative imagination. Judge Learned Hand, who has been long and
wisely at this business, has stated the philosophy of the task and has thereby
implied the qualifications for its exercise:
"As courts become increasingly sure of themselves, interpretation more and more
involves an imaginative projection of the expressed purpose upon situations arising
later, for which the parties did not provide and which they did not have in mind. Out
of the rivers of ink that have been spilled upon that subject I know nothing that
has emerged wlhich enlightens us beyond the caution that departure from the textnecessary as it is-must always be made with circumspection." '

"Judicial legislation" is a phrase often in the mouths of those who
think a statute is an inert mass of words to be read with sterile literalnesi.
But it also embodies part of the constitutional struggle to secure institutions
calculated to preclude autocracy by distributing governmental powers among
the three departments of government. "It is always a dangerous business to
fill in the text of a statute from its purposes, and, although it is a duty often
unavoidable, it is utterly unwarranted unless the omission from, or corruption
of, the text is plain." 8 These are weighty words because they come freighted
with the experience of the most philosophic of our judges. The same thought
was recently put in a homespun way by Lord Justice Denning: "A judge
must not alter the material of which it [an act] is woven, but he can and
should iron out the creases." 9
The effective authors of federal legislation have, ever since the days of
Alexander Hamilton, largely been the various agencies of the GoVernment.
For judicial' construction to stick close to what the legislation says and not
draw prodigally upon unformulated purposes or directions makes for
careful draftsmanship and for legislative responsibility. This applies equally
6. 1 BisHop, CRIMINAL LAw § 291b (9th ed., Zane and Zollmann, 1923).
7. Jackson & Co. v..Royal Norwegian Gov't, 177 F.2d 694, 702 (2d Cir. 1949) (dissenting opinion).
8. Learned Hand, J., in Harris v. Comm'r, 178 F.2d 861, 864 (2d Cir. 1949).
9. Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher, [19491 2 K.B. 481, 499 (C.A.).
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to state legislatures. Judicial expansion of meaning beyond the limits indicated
is reprehensible because it encourages slipshodness in draftsmanship and
irresponsibility in legislation. It also enlists too heavily the private social and
economic views of judges.
These are commonplaces. But iheir application, with delicate regard for
their contradictory nuances and with due adjustment of their relevant claims,
constitutes the problems of statutory construction. Lawyers cannot be provided with a vade inecuinr to advise their clients, or judges to decide controversies. What is helpful is to nlarge the understanding of both, by a
concentration of instances in the different fields that from time to time are the
chief concern of legislation, so that the mind neither rusts in literalness nor
roams in undisciplined looseness. That is precisely the value of these papers.
By isolating the problems pertinent to special types of legislation, they make
vivid the organisms created by the legislature and outline the environment
essential for the full life of these organisms.

